ABSTRACT In mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), it is effective to retrieve data items using top-k query. However, accurate results may not be acquired in environments when malicious nodes are present. In this paper, we assume that malicious nodes attempt to replace necessary data items with unnecessary ones (we call these data replacement attacks), and propose methods for top-k query processing and malicious node identification based on node grouping in MANETs. In order to maintain the accuracy of the query result, nodes reply with k data items with the highest score along multiple routes, and the query-issuing node tries to detect attacks from the information attached to the reply messages. After detecting attacks, the query-issuing node tries to identify the malicious nodes through message exchanges with other nodes. When multiple malicious nodes are present, the query-issuing node may not be able to identify all malicious nodes at a single query. It is effective for a node to share information about the identified malicious nodes with other nodes. In our method, each node divides all nodes into groups by using the similarity of the information about the identified malicious nodes. Then, it identifies malicious nodes based on the information on the groups. We conduct simulation experiments by using a network simulator, QualNet5.2, to verify that our method achieves high accuracy of the query result and identifies malicious nodes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, there has been an increasing interest in mobile ad hoc network (MANET), which is constructed by only mobile nodes. Since such self-distributed networks do not require pre-existing base stations, they are expected to apply to various situations such as military affairs and rescue work in disaster sites. In MANETs, since each node has poor resources (i.e., the communication bandwidth and the battery life of mobile nodes are limited), it is effective to retrieve only the necessary data items using top-k query, in which data items are ordered according to a particular attribute score, and the query-issuing node acquires the data items with k highest scores in the network (the global top-k result). On the other hand, in MANETs, if a normal node becomes malicious owing to an attack from outside the network, the malicious node tries to disrupt the operations of the system. In this case, the user whose network contains the malicious node will typically continue to operate the system normally, unaware of the threat, while the malicious node may execute a variety of attacks (e.g. Denial of Service (DoS) attack [28] such as blackhole attack).
Let us consider a purpose of malicious node attacking top-k query processing. Basically, malicious nodes attempt to disrupt query-issuing node's acquisition of the global top-k result for a long period, without being detected. However, DoS attacks in MANETs have been actively studied for long years, and as a result, using existing techniques, such attacks can be exposed by the query-issuing node or intermediate nodes. Here, a remarkable characteristic of top-k query processing is that the query-issuing node does not know the global top-k result beforehand. Therefore, even if a malicious node replaces high-score data items with its own low-score ones, when relaying the data items, it is difficult for the query-issuing to detect the attack, and it may believe that all the received data items with k highest scores are the global top-k result. In this paper, we define a new type of attack called data replacement attack (DRA), in which a malicious node replaces the received data items (which we call the local top-k result) with unnecessary yet proper data items (e.g., its own low-score data items). Since DRAs are a strong attack, and more difficult to detect than other traditional types of attack, some specific mechanism for defending against DRAs are required. 1 shows an example of performing a top-k query in a MANETs, where a rescue worker in a disaster site acquires data items with 2 highest scores (e.g., biological information about victims). Let us assume that the mobile node held by the rescue worker at P 3 becomes a malicious node, and it replaces the received highest score data item whose score is 94, with its own lower-score data item whose score is 84. Therefore, the node held by the rescue worker at P 1 , who issues a top-k query, cannot acquire the data item whose score is 94, and it cannot know the node at P 3 performed a DRA.
In this paper, we propose top-k query processing and malicious node identification methods again DRAs in MANETs. In the top-k query processing method, in order to maintain accuracy of query result and detect attacks, nodes reply with data items with k highest scores along multiple routes. Moreover, to enable detection of DRA, reply messages include information on the route along which reply messages are forwarded, and thus the query-issuing node can know the data items that properly belong to the message. In the malicious node identification method, the query-issuing node first narrows down the malicious node candidates, using information in the received message, and then requests information on the data items sent by these candidates. In this way, the query-issuing node can identify the malicious node.
When there are multiple malicious nodes in the network, it is difficult to identify all the malicious nodes in a single query. By using our methods, nodes are likely to identify the malicious nodes which are near their own location, while they hardly identify the malicious nodes which are far from their own location. Therefore, in order to quickly identify more malicious nodes, it is effective to share the information about the identified malicious nodes with other nodes. In this case, however, a malicious node may declare fake information that claims normal nodes as the malicious nodes (false notification attack (FNA)). We need some method to correctly identify the malicious nodes against FNAs.
Therefore, in our malicious node identification method, after nodes share the malicious node identification information, each node divides all nodes into some groups based on the similarity of the information. Then, the node determines the final judgement of malicious nodes based on the judgment result of each group. In our method, even if malicious nodes claim that normal nodes are the malicious nodes, there is a decisive difference in the nature of the information possessed by normal and malicious nodes concerning the identified malicious nodes, and therefore, the normal nodes can easily identify the malicious nodes. Furthermore, even if malicious nodes mix the correct information on malicious nodes identified by other normal nodes with their fake information, in order to increase their similarity with normal nodes, the normal nodes in the same group will nonetheless certainly identify the malicious nodes, but not normal nodes. Thus, the information from the malicious nodes can be removed and there is little influence of FNAs.
Our contributions are as follows:
• We describe a new attack model, DRA, in which a malicious node replaces necessary data items with unnecessary ones, and we analyze the effects of such an attack on top-k query processing when there are multiple malicious nodes in the networks.
• We propose methods for processing top-k queries and for identifying malicious nodes against a DRA in MANETs.
• We describe an attack model, FNA, in which a malicious node sends fake information that claims some normal nodes as malicious nodes, and we evaluate the effects of such an attack.
• We verify that our proposed methods can achieve high accuracy of the query result and identify malicious nodes, through extensive simulations that take into account physical layer effects in the networks. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we review related work. In Section III, we describe our operating assumptions. In Section IV, we present our proposed methods for top-k query processing and identification of malicious nodes in MANETs. In Section V, we discuss our methods including typical situations when the query-issuing node cannot identify malicious nodes and the influence on FNAs. In Section VI, we discuss the results of the simulation experiments. Finally, in Section VII, we summarize the paper.
Note that some of the results of this paper have been reported in [23] . In this paper, we have mainly extended the malicious node identification method, assuming a situation when there are multiple malicious nodes in the networks. More specifically, the extended method shares information on the detected malicious nodes among other nodes, and quickly detect more malicious nodes.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we review existing studies on secure routing, top-k query processing methods, and reputation systems.
A. SECURE ROUTING METHODS
In the field of MANET, secure routing protocols protect against falsification of data and DoS attacks [28] have been well studied. Secure routing protocols commonly employ data transmission along multiple routes (from the source node to the destination node) [11] , [15] , [16] , [19] , [34] , and data encryption using symmetric or public keys [6] , [9] , [12] . In [11] , the authors have proposed a method in which the source node determines multiple safe routes (from the source node to the destination node) by encrypting the route request message using a hash function before sending data items. However, the methods neither assume top-k queries nor protect against DRA, and thus cannot be directly applied to the problem addressed in this paper. In [6] , the authors have proposed a method in which each sensor node sends data items with message authentication code (MAC), which are encrypted by using a symmetric key. When each node receives the message, it confirms the validity of the message by checking whether the received MAC is same as the MAC which is calculated from the received data items encrypted by the symmetric key. However, even if data items are encrypted, DRAs described above cannot be avoided by these methods, because malicious nodes merely replace received data items with data items of their own.
B. TOP-k QUERY PROCESSING METHODS
In the field of database systems and distributed systems, top-k query is effective to retrieve only the required data items in a large amount of data items. In [2] , [5] , [18] , [20] , and [29] , the authors have proposed methods to reduce energy consumption and traffic in unstructured P2P networks or wireless sensor networks, by enabling nodes to filter unnecessary data items. However, these methods do not protect against DRA, and are unsuitable for use in MANETs, because they are not adapted to node mobility.
In [1] , [10] , [25] , and [26] , we proposed top-k query processing methods for MANETs, adapted to the node mobility, maintaining high accuracy of the top-k result and reducing traffic. In [10] and [25] , we proposed methods in which query messages include the scores of data items, and nodes narrow down candidates that may include the global top-k result, resulting in reduced communication traffic volume. In [1] and [26] , we proposed methods in which the queryissuing node first retrieves the k-highest score (threshold) in the network, and then acquires data items with scores equal to or greater than the threshold. However, these methods are not designed for environments in which malicious nodes exist, for example, the data items in the top-k result are sent back along a single route, and thus are vulnerable to DRA.
In [27] and [30] - [33] , the authors have proposed secure top-k query processing methods in the environment where there are some malicious nodes in a network. In [27] , the authors have proposed a method in which each sensor node sends each data item attached both the hash value of one priority data item and that of one superior data item. After the source node received the top-k result, it ensures the safety of the received data items to check whether the received hash values correspond with hash values calculated by the received data items. In these methods, the sender node protects against fabrication of data items by sending data items encrypting with a symmetric key. However, these methods cannot handle DRAs. Especially, in [32] , the authors have proposed a method against false data injection attacks, where malicious nodes generate new and false data items (i.e., other nodes' data items or data items whose score are not same as the score calculated from raw data items and query conditions) and send back them. However, we assume that raw data items are generated from some special devices and softwares such as medical sensors, which can be read but cannot be modified even by the owner nodes. Therefore, we assume that malicious nodes perform DRAs, which malicious nodes replaces necessary data items with unnecessary yet proper data items.
C. REPUTATION SYSTEMS
In the distributed systems where there are malicious nodes or failure nodes, reputation systems, which evaluate the performance of nodes to exclude the malicious nodes from the network, have been widely discussed. Our proposed method seems to be a kind of reputation systems since each mobile node shares the information about the malicious nodes and excludes the malicious nodes from MANETs.
In the field of sensor networks and MANETs, many reputation systems considering the reliability of nodes in the network have been proposed [3] , [13] , [14] , [17] , [21] , [22] , [24] . In [13] , each node calculates the local reputation scores of other nodes from correctness of received files, and floods the score information in the network. Then, each node calculates the global reputation score from its own and received local scores. At last, it determines the node whose global score is lower than a threshold as the malicious nodes. In [3] , [21] , and [22] , the authors have proposed methods in which each node manages the reputation values of its neighboring nodes in MANET. In these methods, each node overhears messages sent by neighboring nodes and determines the reputation score of neighboring nodes by analyzing their messages. However, these methods do not assume that the malicious nodes send false reputation scores.
In [7] and [8] , the authors have proposed methods against false notification attacks in reputation systems. Especially, in [8] , source nodes exchange a cryptographic key with destination nodes in advance, and send their own ID, along with the past and current reputation scores of destination nodes, in encrypted form. The destination node decodes and confirms the received reputation scores. Thus, it can discard VOLUME 4, 2016 the false reputation scores. However, these methods assume information sharing only between source and destination nodes, whereas in our method nodes share information with all other nodes in the network.
III. ASSUMPTIONS
The system environment is assumed to be a MANET constructed by mobile nodes held by members of a highly important collaborative work such as rescue operations and military affairs in which the members issue top-k queries to efficiently acquire data items. In a case of rescue operations, ambulance clews need to pick up victims in a critical condition. The attackers such as terrors hack a node which an ambulance clew holds because the attackers aim to spread the damage for a long time. The ambulance clew whose node has been hacked does not recognize that his/her own node has been hacked, and the malicious node sends data items which he/she does not intend.
A. SYSTEM MODEL
The set of all mobile nodes in the system is denoted by M = {M 1 ,M 2 , . . . , M n }, where n is the total number of mobile nodes and M i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is a node identifier. The set of all data items in the entire network is denoted by
where d is the total number of data items and
is a data identifier. Each data item is retained by a specific node. Since we assume a highly important collaborative work, highly secure communications and data exchanges are essential. Therefore, we assume that each node has the public key of all nodes in the network. When a node replies with data items (i.e., sends a reply message), it encrypts the data items using the public key of the destination node to avoid intermediate nodes modifying and reading the data items. In addition, the node sends the reply message (including the encrypted data items) to some of its neighbors after encrypting the message using the neighbors' public key. This is to ensure a secure communication with neighbors and avoid others overhearing the message. On the other hand, when a node sends (or relays) a query, it broadcasts the query without encryption since a query is not aimed to send to specific nodes but should be sent to all neighbors.
The scores of data items can be calculated based on the query condition and specified scoring functions. Raw data items are generated from some special devices and softwares (which are independent of the mobile nodes' OS and applications) such as medical sensors, which can be read but cannot be modified even by the owner nodes. Therefore, even if a node is hacked by attackers, it cannot modify its own data items, i.e., a malicious node cannot generate incorrect and fake data items whose scores are unfairly high. This assumption is also to achieve highly secure collaborative work. In order to acquire data items with the k highest scores in a MANET, each intermediate node should selectively send data items with higher scores. Therefore, the scores of reply data items in a reply message are not encrypted, with the public key of the query-issuing node, i.e., each mobile node can know the scores of data items in the reply message.
B. ATTACK MODEL
In this paper, we assume that the number of the malicious nodes in the network is m. A malicious node seeks a way to disrupt the query-issuing node's acquisition of the global top-k result, without being detected. If the malicious node falsifies the scores of its own data items or that of others' own data items when relaying them, the query-issuing node can easily detect the attack by comparing received data items' scores (attached directly with the reply message) with the scores calculated from the received data items. Thus, in this paper, we assume that malicious nodes attempt only a DRA in top-k query processing. When a malicious node does DRA, it randomly replaces h · k (i.e., h denotes the rate of replacement) data items in the local top-k result with its own data items, which have lower scores than the local top-k result.
Moreover, we assume that each node floods the entire network with the information about the identified malicious nodes in order to share it with other nodes. Aiming to confuse normal nodes and make them misjudge the malicious node identification, a malicious node does a FNA, where it notifies some normal nodes as malicious nodes. If each malicious node randomly notifies normal nodes as malicious nodes, the FNA is easily detected by other normal nodes because only this node claims these normal nodes as malicious ones in most cases. Therefore, multiple malicious nodes collaborate to notify same normal nodes. This type of FNA has more influence in malicious node identification.
As mentioned, we assume that malicious nodes do two types of attacks (i.e., DRA and FNA), but do not always do them, i.e., they sometimes do only one type of attack and sometimes do both.
IV. PROPOSED METHOD A. OVERVIEW
In our proposed top-k query processing method, the queryissuing node first floods a query over the entire network, and each node receiving the query stores information on all possible routes to the query-issuing node. Then, each receiving node replies with data items with the k highest scores to two neighbor nodes. In addition, each node includes, in its reply message, information on the reply message forwarding routes which consist of pairs of sender node and next node IDs. Based on this attached information, the query-issuing node can detect an attack occurring along a reply message route. In MANETs, since the network topology dynamically changes due to the mobility of nodes, radio link disconnections can occur between nodes. Therefore, if a node detects a radio link disconnection along one of its two reply routes, it sends back the data items to a different node, to which those data items have not yet been sent, to ensure that they are sent back along two different routes.
In our proposed malicious node identification method, a query-issuing node that detects a DRA narrows down the malicious node candidates based on the received reply messages. Then, the query-issuing node determines whether a given reply message sent back by a malicious node candidate includes replaced data items or not, by sending inquiries to nodes receiving reply messages from this candidate. In this way, the query-issuing node can identify the malicious node. Here, each node tends to identify the neighboring malicious nodes, but hardly identify the malicious nodes which are far from it. Therefore, nodes share the information on identified malicious nodes to detect the malicious nodes quickly. Specifically, after each node identifies malicious nodes, it floods the information on the identified malicious nodes within the network. When each node has received a certain number of queries, it performs malicious node identification procedures based on the received information. Specifically, it divides nodes into relevant groups based on similarities of the information on malicious nodes detected by those nodes, and then identifies malicious nodes based on the results of malicious node identifications by these groups.
B. TOP-k QUERY PROCESSING 1) QUERY FORWARDING
First, the query-issuing node floods a query over the entire network. The query consists of the node identifier of the query-issuing node (Query-issuing nodeID), the query identifier of the query (Query ID), the number of requested data items (k), the query condition, and a list of the node identifiers of nodes on the path along which the query message is to be transmitted (Query path). Specifically, the query-issuing node, M p , specifies the query condition and the number of requested data items, k. Then, M p transmits a query message whose Query path includes its identifier, M p , to its neighbor nodes. A node, M q , which receives the query, transmits it according to Algorithm 1. In Algorithm 1, hop count denotes the number of hops to the query-issuing node, based on the number of nodes included in the Query path. Then, M q sets a waiting time for reply (RD) according to the following equation:
where hop cnt denotes the number of hops to the query-issuing node, hop max denotes the maximum number of hops (calculated based on the area size of the network and the radio range of nodes), and T wait is a positive constant. In this equation, as hop cnt increases, RD decreases. When M q receives the query later again, it stores the ID of the query sender node as its neighbor node, as well as, the Query path and the number of hops (Lines 10-11 in Algorithm 1).
2) REPLY FORWARDING
When RD has passed, each node sends back a reply message, which includes its own node identifier (Sender node ID), the identifier of the next node along the reply route (Dest node ID), a list of the data items (including their scores) Store Query path and hop counts as its Parent Query path 4: Store the node ID at the end of Query path as its parent 5: Set RD for replying data items 6: /* Send the query message to neighbor nodes */ 7:
Add M q s node ID to the end of Query path 8: Send the query to neighbor nodes 9: else 10: Store Query path and hop count as its Neighbor Query path 11: Store the node ID at the end of Query path as its neighbor 12 : end if and the node identifiers of the nodes possessing them (Data list), and a list summarizing the reply message routes, i.e., a list of the pairs of sender and next node identifiers (Forwarding Route).
In Algorithm 2, node M r sends a reply message when its RD has passed. Here, REP denotes a reply message and REP. FR denotes the forwarding route list consisting of (Sender node ID, Dest node ID), which denotes the list of sender and next node identifier pairs, and R denotes the maximum number of reply messages to be re-sent. M r selects the next node from its neighboring nodes, which has the least hop count and least overlap between its Query path and the parent node's Query path (Line 9 in Algorithm 2).
3) LINK DISCONNECTION
In MANETs, the network topology changes dynamically due to the movement of nodes. When a radio link disconnection to the parent node or next node occurs, a replying node, M r , cannot send a reply message, resulting in reduced accuracy of the query result. Therefore, if a node sends a reply message R times but does not receive an ACK from the parent or next node, the sending node detects a radio link disconnection; at which point the node sends the reply message to another neighbor node among those whose routes to the query-issuing node include the least overlap between Query path in the replay message and their own Query path (Lines 27-30 in Algorithm 2). If the sending node has no neighbor nodes which satisfy this condition, it sends the reply message to a neighbor selected in the same way as in selecting the next node in ''Reply Forwarding'' process among nodes which have not been sent the reply message (Lines 35-36 in Algorithm 2).
4) DETECTING ATTACKS
After the query-issuing node, M p , receives all the reply messages, it detects a DRA according to Algorithm Select a Neighbor whose Neighbor Query path least overlaps with the parent Query path as a DestNode 10: end if 11: Add the local top-k result to REP 12: for i = 0 to 1 do do 13: if i = 0 then 14: Add (M r , parent node) to received REP.FR and send REP to parent node 15 : Resend REP to parent 29: else if M r does not receive ACK from DestNode by waiting time for retransmission and the number of retransmissions < R then 30: Resend REP to DestNode 31: else if the number of retransmissions > R then 32: /* M r detects the disconnection of radio link */ 33: if M r has sent REP to all Neighbor then 34: Discard REP for each Top-k Result do 7: if REP.FR includes the node ID of a node processing a data item in Top-k Result and REP.Data does not include the data item then 8: Insert a route from the node with the missing data item to the query-issuing node into SendRoute 9: end if 10: end for 11: end for 12: if SendRoute = ∅ then 13: Detect Attack 14: end if the k highest scores, acquired by the query-issuing node, REP.Data and REP.FR respectively denote the data list and forwarding route included in the reply message, REP, and SendRoute denotes the set of node identifiers along the route from the node possessing a given data item to the queryissuing node (the query-issuing node can know the SendRoute from the forwarding route information). If the nodes which have data items in the top-k result are included in SendRoute (or REP.FR), but the data items in the top-k result are not included in REP.Data, the query-issuing node detects a DRA (Line 13 in Algorithm 3), and initiates the malicious node identification process described in Section IV-C1. If the query-issuing node does not detect a DRA, it completes the top-k query processing. Table 1 shows the scores of data items retained by each node. Here, the malicious node, M 2 , replaces data items having the highest and /* Inquire to the candidates of a malicious node */ 13: Perform the procedure of Algorithm 5 14: end if second highest scores among received data items (score: 98, 91), with data items it possesses, whose scores are lower than the third highest data item it received, and now sends the corrupted data items (score: 86, 72, 65). Receiving the reply message from M 2 , M 1 can know that M 5 and M 6 , which have data items included in the top-k result, are on the forwarding route included in the reply message from M 2 . However, the data items received from M 2 do not include data items of the top-k result which M 5 and M 6 possess (score: 98, 91). Therefore, the query-issuing node detects that the data items it received from M 2 have been corrupted (attacked), and knows precisely which data items have been replaced.
C. MALICIOUS NODE IDENTIFICATION METHOD 1) LOCAL IDENTIFICATION
After detecting a DRA, the query-issuing node tries to identify the malicious nodes. In Algorithms 4 and 5, the query-issuing node narrows down the candidates for malicious nodes, and identifies the malicious nodes by making respective inquiries. In our proposed method, according to Algorithm 4, the query-issuing node narrows down the malicious node candidates by using SendRoute, obtained in Algorithm 3. In Algorithm 4, Candidate denotes the set of node identifiers of malicious node candidates, ordered by ascending hop count from the query-issuing node, and missing Top-k result denotes the replaced data items. The nodes included in SendRoute, whose data items are corrupted (by the malicious node), are all possible attackers. if scores includes the score of the missing data items in global Top-k result then 28: return
end if 30: end if 31: end for Therefore, the query-issuing node recognize these nodes as malicious node candidates. When the number of malicious node candidates is one, the query-issuing node identifies this node as the malicious node and completes the procedure (Line 10 in Algorithm 4).
Algorithm 5 shows the procedures for inquiring about information on data items sent from malicious node candidates. Here, MNI-INQ denotes an inquiry message, which contains the query-issuing node identifier, the node identifier of the destination node for the inquiry message (M dest i ), the set of malicious node candidate identifiers (Candidate), and the forwarding route of the inquiry message from the query-issuing node to the destination node (InqRoute). M dest i denotes the destination node to which Candidate[i] (ith candidate) has sent a reply message. MNI-IREP denotes a message sent in reply to the inquiry message, which contains the scores of the data items, and the identifiers of nodes possessing these data items, which are included in the reply message received from the Candidate[i] node.
In ascending hop count of the malicious node candidates. The query-issuing node, M p , tries to successively identify the malicious node. Specifically, it determines InqRoute for each malicious node candidate so that it does not include the malicious node candidate, and sends an inquiry message to nodes at the top of the InqRoute A MNI-INQ message is not sent to nodes whose hop count is one, because the queryissuing node receives reply messages directly from such nodes (Line 7 in Algorithm 5 3 shows an example of how the query-issuing node identifies the malicious node after detecting a DRA, in the cases where the data items included in the top-k result possessed by M 5 and M 6 , are not included among the data items in the reply message from M 2 . The query-issuing node, M 1 , determines each route along which a reply message is transmitted from M 5 or M 6 
2) SENDING NOTIFICATION MESSAGES
After identifying the malicious nodes, the query-issuing node floods the information on the identified malicious nodes within the network. More specifically, the query-issuing node, M p , sends a notification message to its neighboring nodes. The notification message contains the query identifier of the query (Q Num ), the node identifier of the query-issuing node (M p ), and the list of the node identifiers of the identified malicious nodes (BL p ). The node, which received the notification message, stores the message, and also forwards it to the neighboring nodes. The node, which received the same notification message again, ignores the message, and also forwards it to the neighboring nodes. Hence, all nodes share the information on the identified malicious nodes in the network.
3) GLOBAL IDENTIFICATION
In our method, each node individually identifies malicious nodes using the shared information by the two steps; node grouping and malicious node identification.
Node Grouping: Each node divides nodes in the network into some groups based on the information in the notification messages received by the nodes, according to Algorithm 6. In Algorithm 6, each node starts this process (i.e., grouping) after receiving Num Query queries. R i (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) denotes the evaluation score by M i , which is represented by an n-dimensional vector, and indicates the malicious nodes identified by M i . More specifically, the j-th element of R i (j = 1, 2, . . . , n) is set to 1 when M i identified M j as the malicious node, and 0 otherwise. sim(a, b) denotes the similarity of evaluation scores between M a and M b . Group denotes groups determined by node grouping, G can denotes candidates of groups, and Group g denotes the g-th group in Group. BL g denotes malicious nodes identified by nodes in Group g , M g,e denotes a node in Group g and Count BL g,f denotes the number of nodes which identify M f included in BL g as a malicious node among nodes in Group g . θ denotes the threshold for the grouping, and ρ denotes the threshold for the cleaning, which is represented by ρ = |Group g | · α (Here, |Group g | denotes the number of nodes in Group g , and α denotes a system parameter (0 ≤ α ≤ 1)).
First, each node calculates the similarity of nodes in terms of identified malicious nodes based on the received notification messages. In order to decrease the influence of differences in the number of identified malicious nodes among nodes, we adopt cosine similarity for similarity calculation (line 7 in Algorithm 6). After the node grouping, some groups may include both normal and malicious nodes. Therefore, the node performs a cleaning in each group to remove the inconsistency. Specifically, if a node, M g,e , in a certain Group g , identifies another node in the same group as a malicious node, M g,e is eliminated from Group g (line 28 in Algorithm 6). After that, a node identifying another node which is identified by less than a certain number of nodes in the same group, is also eliminated from the group (line 32 in Algorithm 6). for each b ∈ n do 7: sim(a, b) = cos(a, b) = R a ·R b R a R b
8:
end for 9: end for 10: /* Node grouping*/ 11: for each a ∈ n do 12: for each b ∈ n do 13: if Mal can = ∅ and sim(a, b) ≥ θ then 14: Insert M a , M b into G can 15: else if Mal can = ∅ and {∀x ∈ Mal can , sim(x, b) ≥ θ } then 16: Insert M b into G can 17: end if 18: end for 19: if G can / ∈ Group then 20:
end if 22: clear G can 23: end for 24 : /* Cleaning in each group */ 25: for each Group do 26: for each M g,e in Group g do 27: if M g,e identified a node include in Group g then 28: eliminate M g,e from Group g
29:
end if 30: for each BL g,f in BL g do 31: if Count BL g,f ≤ ρ and M g,e identifies BLg, f then 32: eliminate M g,e from Group g 33: end if 34: end for 35: end for 36: end for By doing so, even if a malicious node notifies a false message which includes fake information on the identified nodes (i.e., cleaning normal nodes as malicious nodes) as well as the same information as other normal nodes to achieve high similarity, the malicious node and the fake information can be eliminated from the group. Table 2 shows an example of notification messages. In Table 2 , the first row shows nodes sending the notification messages, (i.e., M 1 , . . . , M 10 ), and the second row shows malicious nodes identified by the nodes of the first row. Table 3 shows the similarities between each pair of nodes, which are calculated based on the messages in Table 2 . In this example, let us assume that M 2 , M 5 and M 8 are malicious nodes. In the case that two nodes notify the same nodes as the malicious nodes, the similarity between these nodes is 1. When θ = 0.7, nodes are firstly divided into
Malicious Node Identification: After the node grouping, each node conclusively determines malicious nodes based on the information about malicious nodes identified by nodes in each group. Here, there are three types of groups, i.e., a group composed of (i) only normal nodes, (ii) only malicious nodes, and (iii) both normal and malicious nodes. 1 The nodes identified as malicious by all nodes in a group of (i) or (iii) are surely malicious nodes. Only in a group of (iii), normal nodes can be identified as malicious by all nodes which collaboratively attack on FNA. Here, since malicious nodes are generally minorities in the entire network, majority based judgment (and pruning) works well for malicious node identification. Therefore, in our method, nodes are confirmed to be malicious when they are determined to be malicious by a number of groups equal to or larger than a certain threshold.
Each node determines malicious nodes according to Algorithm 7. Here, Malicious denotes conclusive malicious nodes and Mal denotes nodes identified as malicious by all the nodes in each group. M x denotes a node notified as a malicious node and Count M x denotes the number of groups where all the nodes identify M x as a malicious node. for each Group do 8: if M x is identified by all nodes in Group g then 9: Mal ⇐ M x 10:
end if 12: end for 13: /* Identified the malicious nodes */ 14: for each M y in Mal do 15: if Count M y ≥ φ then 16: Malicious ⇐ M y
17:
end if 18: end for 19: for each Malicious do 20: for each Group do 21: if Malicious m ∈ Group g then 22: Delete Malicious m from Group g
23:
end if 24: end for 25: end for 26: end while φ denotes the threshold for each node to conclusively determine malicious nodes, which is included by φ = Group Num ·β (0 ≤ β ≤ 1) where, Group Num is the number of groups and β is a system parameter. In this method, if the number of groups, in which all nodes identified M x (M x ∈ Mal) as a malicious node, is more than the threshold, φ, M x is conclusively determined as a malicious node and added to Malicious (line 15 in Algorithm 7). Table 4 shows an example of conclusively determining malicious nodes. The first row of Table 4 shows the group identifier, second row shows the query-issuing nodes included in each group, and third row shows Mal. When β is set to 0.3, the threshold φ becomes 1.2. According to Table 4 , because M 5 is included in three groups, it is conclusively determined as a malicious node. Then, M 5 is eliminated from G 3 . On the other hand, since M 1 , M 2 and M 4 are respectively identified by only one group, they are not determined as malicious node.
V. DISCUSSION A. CASES OF NOT DETECTING A DRA
In our top-k query processing method, each node sends back data items to two neighbor nodes, and the query-issuing node successfully acquires data items in the top-k result, even if one of the routes includes a malicious node, because the alternate route can safely ensure that the required data items are properly sent back. However, especially when the node density in the network is low, some nodes may not have multiple neighbor nodes, and can send back data items along only one route. If data items are sent through a malicious node on the singular route or all two nodes on multiple paths are malicious, the query-issuing node will not acquire data items replaced by the malicious node. Moreover, in our proposed method, the query-issuing node can detect attacks only when it receives reply messages from multiple nodes. For example, when the query-issuing node has only one neighbor node, it cannot detect attacks. In Fig. 4 (a) , the query-issuing node, M 1 , receives a reply message only from M 2 , and thus cannot recognize the DRA.
On the other hand, depending on the given network topology, malicious nodes are sometimes unable to replace the requested data items and cannot disrupt the acquisition of the top-k result. In Fig. 4 (b) , for example, since the malicious node, M 4 , does not receive reply messages from any other nodes, it cannot attack, and the query-issuing node can acquire the correct top-k result. In this case, the malicious node sends normal reply messages, because other nodes may recognize the node as malicious if it ignores the message. In Fig. 4 (c) , though the malicious node, M 4 , replaces data items, the corrupted local top-k result is not included in the global top-k result. Thus, the global top-k result is not affected by the DRA. Of course, in these cases, though the queryissuing node can acquire the data items in the global top-k result, it cannot detect the DRA or identify the malicious node.
B. INFLUENCE OF FNA
In the global identification method, each node identifies malicious nodes based on the shared information on the identified malicious nodes. However, the malicious nodes attempt FNAs to configure normal nodes and make them misjudge the malicious node identification. In addition, to disturb the identification, some malicious nodes may do only FNAs (we call them liar nodes). In this section, we discuss the influence of FNA.
First, when a malicious node notifies the information on a randomly selected node as a malicious node, there is little influence of the identification. This is because only few malicious nodes claim the same normal node as malicious while other (many) nodes do not. Therefore, even by a majoritybased method, where each node identifies a node as malicious when the number of nodes identifying it is more than a threshold, the malicious nodes are substantially identified. Our proposed method can also defend against FNAs, since the similarity among normal nodes and malicious (or liar) nodes is low, i.e., malicious nodes have little possibility to be classified into the same groups with normal nodes, and the number of groups consisting of normal nodes is generally much more than that of malicious nodes. Therefore, there is little possibility to determine normal nodes as malicious nodes.
Next, some malicious and liar nodes may collaboratively claim the same normal node as a malicious node. In this case, because the number of nodes which notify a normal node as a malicious node becomes large, by a single majority-based method, the normal node may be conclusively determined as a malicious node. Here, it should be noted that normal nodes tend to identify near-by malicious nodes, and thus, the identified malicious nodes have some diversity among them. In our proposed method, since nodes which identify the same nodes as malicious are usually classified into the same groups, the number of groups including malicious nodes which have done FNAs is small. Therefore, the misidentification caused by FNAs is less happened than that in the simple majority method. Moreover, malicious nodes may try to increase their similarity with other nodes (for example, by announcing information that includes nodes identified by normal nodes as malicious), in order to increase the number of groups that include them. In our proposed method, only nodes identified by all nodes in each group are decided as malicious nodes identified by the group. Therefore, there is little possibility to conclusively determine normal nodes as malicious nodes.
VI. SIMULATION EXPERIMENT
In this section, we discuss the results of the simulation experiments conducted to evaluate the performance of our proposed methods. For the simulation experiments, we used a network simulator, QualNet5.2. 2 
A. SIMULATION MODEL
The number of mobile nodes in the entire system is 50 (M 1 ,M 2 , . . . , M 50 ) . These mobile nodes exist in an area of 500[m] × 500[m] and move according to the random waypoint model [4] , with the speed and pause time set at 0.5 [m/sec] and 30 [sec], respectively. The initial position is randomly determined. Each mobile node transmits messages and data items using IEEE 802.11b device whose data transmission rate is 11 [Mbps] . The transmission range of each mobile node is roughly 100 [m] . Each mobile node has 50 data items, whose size is 128 [B] . The score of each data item is randomly determined from a range of 1 to 999. The maximum number of times of resending data items, R, is 3.
m malicious nodes (denoted by ''MN ''), which do both DRA and FNA, and l liar nodes (denoted by ''LN ''), which do FNA only, are randomly determined among all the nodes in the network. A malicious node replaces 0.5 · k data items, received from other nodes, with its own data items as DRA. When a node does a FNA, it floods a notification message including the information on same normal nodes and the malicious node which is included the first received notification message from a node. After all, all nodes doing FNAs basically notify the same normal node as a malicious node but they do not notify themselves. Table 5 shows the parameters used in the simulation experiments, and their values. These parameters are basically fixed to the constant values to the left of the parenthetical values, and each is varied over the range specified in the parenthesis in a simulation experiment. In the following, we evaluate our proposed top-k query processing method and malicious node identification method; local identification in Section VI-B and global identification in Section VI-C.
B. TOP-k QUERY PROCESSING AND LOCAL IDENTIFICATION
We compare the performance of our proposed top-k query processing method with that of the naive method. In the naive method, the query-issuing node floods a query over the entire network, and a node receiving the query sends the local 2 Scalable Network Technologies: Creators of Qualnet Network Simulator Software, <http://www.scalable-networks.com> VOLUME 4, 2016 top-k result only to its parent node. We evaluate the following criteria for each method where the query-issuing node is randomly selected every 30 [sec] and this process is reported 1,000 times.
• Accuracy of the query result: the average ratio of the number of data items included in top-k result, which are acquired by the query-issuing node to k.
• Traffic: the average of the total traffic volume required for processing a top-k query and that for identifying the malicious nodes. Table 6 shows each message size in our proposed and naive method. In Table 6 , in our proposed method, i denotes the number of node identifiers included in Query path attached to the query message. j denotes the number of pairs of sender and next node included in the forwarding route list attached to the reply message, and l denotes the number of nodes on the route along which the inquiry message is sent. • Malicious Node Identification Ratio: the ratio of the number of malicious nodes identified by the queryissuing node for a single query in our proposed method tom. In the naive method, this ratio is always 0 since the query-issuing node cannot detect an attack.
1) IMPACT OF THE NUMBER OF REQUESTED DATA ITEMS
We examine the effect of the number of requested data items, k. Fig. 5 shows the simulation result. In these graphs, the x-axis indicates k, and the y-axis indicates the accuracy of the query result in Fig. 5 (a) , the traffic in Fig. 5 (b) , and the malicious node identification ratio in Fig. 5 (c) . In the graphs of the accuracy of the query result (Figs. 5 (a) and 6 (a)), ''Attack'' means cases that the malicious nodes performed effective DRAs (i.e., the cases that the query-issuing node can detect DRAs or cannot detect DRAs like Fig. 4 (a) ), and ''no-Attack'' means cases that DRAs of malicious nodes did not affect the query result (i.e., the cases shown in Figs. 4 (b) and (c)). 3 From Fig. 5 (a) , as k increases, the accuracy of the query result typically decreases in both methods, because packet losses increases with the increase in size of replies containing k data items. In the case of ''Attack'' in the naive method, the accuracy of the query result becomes zero when k equals 1. This is because the query-issuing node never acquires the data item with the highest score, since the malicious nodes 3 Note that even in these cases, the query-issuing node sometimes cannot acquire the global top-k result due to packet losses. replace this data item in all cases. In our proposed methods, though malicious nodes attack, the accuracy of the query result remains high, because data items are sent back along multiple routes. Even if a data item is lost on a route due to packet loss, it can be sent back to the query-issuing node along another route.
From Fig. 5 (b) , as k increases, traffic increases because of the increase in reply message size. In the proposed method, the traffic is much larger than in the naive method, because each node sends reply messages only to its parent node in the naive method, but to two nodes in our method. In fact, in the proposed method, the traffic is more than twice as large as in the naive method. This is also due to more often re-sent messages due to packet loss. Meanwhile, the traffic required to identify malicious nodes in the proposed method is little because the MNI-INQ messages do not include data items (only data scores). Thus, the query-issuing node can identify malicious nodes with much less traffic than is required by its acquisition of the query result.
From Fig. 5 (c) , in our proposed method, regardless of k, the ratio that the query-issuing node did not identify the malicious nodes is more than 50%. Here, this includes cases (about 20%) the query-issuing node did not detect DRAs since the attack are not effective as mentioned in Section V-A. That is the ratio that the query-issuing node detected DRAs but did not identify the malicious node is about 30%. This is because the query-issuing node sometimes can not receive MNI-IREP due to packet loss. Moreover, when multiple malicious nodes are present in the network, the query-issuing node may not succeed in making identification inquires, because malicious nodes are present on the inquiry path. However, from Fig. 5 (a) , our proposed methods can maintain the accuracy of the query result, and local identification is effective because the query-issuing node identifies some malicious nodes (about 50%) at a single query. As k increases, the identification ratio increases. This is because, as k increases, the number of data items in the global top-k result replaced by malicious nodes (i.e., 0.5 · k ) increases, and thus, occasions to detect the attacks also increase.
2) IMPACT OF THE NUMBER OF MALICIOUS NODES
We examine the effect of the number of malicious nodes, m. Fig. 6 shows the simulation result. In these graphs, the x-axis indicates m, and the y-axis indicates the accuracy of the query result in Fig. 6 (a) , the traffic in Fig. 6 (b) , and the malicious node identification ratio in Fig. 6 (c) . From Fig. 6 (a) , in our proposed method, regardless of m, the accuracy of the query result is higher than in the naive method. This is because, in our proposed method, each data item is sent back along multiple routes, so that the queryissuing node can acquire the required data items.
From Fig. 6 (b) , regardless of m, the traffic is almost constant in both methods because a DRA has no influence on the number of data items in a reply message. In our proposed method for identification, regardless of m, there is little traffic.
From Fig. 6 (c) , as m increases, the ratio that no malicious node was identified decreases. This is because, as m increases, the opportunity of DRA increases, and then the query-issuing node has more chances to detect the attacks. Here, even if m is large, it is difficult to identify more than three malicious nodes at a single query. This is because DRAs are sometimes not detectable, as mentioned in Section V-A. Moreover, when replaced data items are replaced again by other malicious nodes, the previous attack is not detectable. In addition, it sometimes happened that a query-issuing node cannot inquire about targeted malicious node candidates, because there are other malicious node candidates on the paths to the nodes who have received reply messages from the targeted candidates
C. GLOBAL-IDENTIFICATION
We compare the performance of our proposed malicious node identification method with that of the simple majoritybased method (denoted by majority method). In the majority method, each node determines the node identified by the largest number (≥ λ) of nodes as a malicious node. Then, it discards the information sent by the determined malicious node, and the same procedure among nodes except for the malicious node repeats until there is no node which is identified as malicious by equal to or larger than λ nodes. Here, λ is a threshold and calculated by λ = IM rec · γ , where IM rec denotes the total number of nodes issuing notification messages and γ denotes a system parameter. Table 7 shows the threshold setting in the methods for global identification. We evaluate the following criteria for each method where each node performs global identification after receiving queries Num Query times and this process is repeated 100 times.
• Number of identified malicious nodes: the average number of identified malicious nodes among 100 times of global identification.
• Rate of misidentification: the rate that a normal node is identified as a malicious node in 100 times.
1) IMPACT OF QUERY-ISSUING TIMES, Num Query
We examine the effect of the query-issuing times, Num Query . Fig. 7 shows the simulation results. In these graphs, the x-axis indicates Num Query , and the y-axis indicates the number of the identified malicious node in Fig. 7 (a) and the rate of the misidentification in fig. 7 (b) . In the graphs From Fig. 7 (a) , as Num Query increases, the number of identified malicious nodes increases in both methods because the number of nodes identified by local identification increases. In our proposed method, more malicious nodes are identified at less query-issuing times than in the majority method. This shows the effectiveness of our method which combines majority-based and similarity-based approaches. By similarity-based grouping, our method can classify collaborating malicious nodes into one group, which reduces the influence of FNAs. Meanwhile, even if the number of liar nodes, LN , increases, the number of identified nodes does not much change in both methods. This is because, in the majority method, nodes conclusively identify malicious nodes simply by the number of nodes identifying those node as malicious based on the threshold. However, as Fig. 7 (b) shows, this leads to misidentification. On the other hand, in our proposed method, as mentioned above and also shown in Fig. 7 (b) , FNAs have less influence even if the number of LN s increase.
From Fig. 7 (b) , as Num Query increases, the rate of misidentification decreases in both methods. In the majority method, the influence of FNAs deceases because of the increase of information on correctly identified malicious nodes. On the other hand, in our proposed method, as Num Query increases, the number of groups consisting of normal nodes increases, and thus, FNAs have lower influence. Fig. 7 (b) also shows that LN s have a significant impact on the majority method, while little on our method. In the majority method, it is obvious that as the number of LN s increases, the number of normal nodes identified as malicious increases. On the other hand, in our proposed method, as mentioned, similarity-based grouping reduces the influence of FNAs.
2) IMPACT OF THE NUMBER OF MALICIOUS NODES
We examine the effect of the number of malicious nodes, m. In this experiment, there is no LN in the network. Fig. 8 shows the simulation result. In these graphs, the x-axis indicates the number of malicious nodes, m, and the y-axis indicates the number of the identified malicious nodes in Fig. 8 (a) and the rate of misidentification in Fig. 8 (b) . Fig. 8 (a) , as m increases, the difference in the number of identified malicious nodes between our method and the majority method increases. This is because, in our proposed method, as m increases, the number of malicious nodes identified by normal nodes increases, and thus, the number of groups consisting of normal nodes increases, which helps to identify more malicious nodes.
From Fig. 8 (b) , when the number of malicious nodes is 8 or more in the majority method, and 10 or more in our method, the rate of misidentification increases. This is because, as m increases, there are more chances of FNAs. In the majority method, as m increases, the number of identified malicious nodes increases, and but misidentification also increases due to static λ. On the other hand, as mentioned, FNAs have little influence on our method even m increases.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed methods for top-k query processing and malicious node identification based on node grouping in MANETs. In order to maintain high accuracy of the query result and detect attacks, nodes reply with k data items with the highest score along multiple routes. After detecting attacks, the query-issuing node narrows down the malicious node candidates and then tries to identify the malicious nodes through message exchanges with other nodes. When multiple malicious nodes are present, the queryissuing node may not be able to identify all malicious nodes at a single query. It is effective for node to share the information about the identified malicious nodes with other nodes. In our method, each node divides all nodes into some groups by using the similarity of the information about the identified malicious nodes. Then, it identifies malicious nodes based on the information on the groups.
In this paper, we did not address the issue of identification of liar nodes (LN s). As part of our future work, we plan to design a method to identify LN s, and also to design a message authentication method to prevent malicious nodes from performing FNAs.
TAKUJI TSUDA received the B.E. degree in multimedia engineering and the M.E. degree in information science and technology from Osaka University, Osaka, Japan, in 2013 and 2015, respectively. His research interests include distributed databases, mobile networks, and mobile computing systems.
YUKA KOMAI received the B.E. degree in multimedia engineering and the M.E. degree in Information Science And Technology from Osaka University, Osaka, Japan, in 2011 and 2013, respectively, where she is currently pursuing the Ph.D. degree in information science and technology. Her research interests include distributed databases, mobile networks, and mobile computing systems.
TAKAHIRO HARA (SM'98) received the B.E., M.E., and D.Eng. degrees in information systems engineering from Osaka University, Japan, in 1995, 1997, and 2000, respectively. He is currently a Full Professor with the Department of Multimedia Engineering, Osaka University. He has authored over 350 journal and conference papers in the areas of databases, mobile computing, peer-to-peer systems, WWW, and wireless networking. His research interests include distributed databases, peer-to-peer systems, mobile networks, and mobile computing systems. He served as the General Chair of the IEEE SRDS 2014 and Mobiquitous 2016, and the Program Chair of the IEEE MDM'06/10, the IEEE AINA'09/14, and the IEEE SRDS'12. He is an ACM Distinguished Scientist and a member of three other learned societies.
SHOJIRO NISHIO (F'12) received the B.E., M.E., and Ph.D. degrees from Kyoto University, Japan, in 1975, 1977, and 1980, respectively. He became a Full Professor with Osaka University, in 1992, and was conferred the title of Distinguished Professor in 2013. Prior to assuming his position as the President in 2015, he also served a number of positions with Osaka University. He has co-authored and co-edited over 55 books and more than 650 refereed journal or conference papers. His areas of expertise in database systems include concurrency control, knowledge discovery, deductive and object-oriented databases, multimedia systems, and database system architectures for advanced networks, such as broadband networks and mobile computing environment. He is a member of eight learned societies. He has served as a member of the Program or Organizing Committees for more than 100 international conferences, including VLDB, ACM SIGMOD, and the IEEE INFOCOM. He received the Medal with Purple Ribbon from the Emperor of Japan in 2011, and the Distinguished Achievement and Contributions Award in information science and technology from the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Japan, in 2014. VOLUME 4, 2016 
